



PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

9774/02

Paper 2 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy and Theology 1

May/June 2019

MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 50

Published

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

Cambridge International will not enter into discussions about these mark schemes.

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Generic Marking Principles

These general marking principles must be applied by all examiners when marking candidate answers. They should be applied alongside the specific content of the mark scheme or generic level descriptors for a question. Each question paper and mark scheme will also comply with these marking principles.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 1:

Marks must be awarded in line with:

- the specific content of the mark scheme or the generic level descriptors for the question
- the specific skills defined in the mark scheme or in the generic level descriptors for the question
- the standard of response required by a candidate as exemplified by the standardisation scripts.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 2:

Marks awarded are always **whole marks** (not half marks, or other fractions).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 3:

Marks must be awarded **positively**:

- marks are awarded for correct/valid answers, as defined in the mark scheme. However, credit is given for valid answers which go beyond the scope of the syllabus and mark scheme, referring to your Team Leader as appropriate
- marks are awarded when candidates clearly demonstrate what they know and can do
- marks are not deducted for errors
- marks are not deducted for omissions
- answers should only be judged on the quality of spelling, punctuation and grammar when these features are specifically assessed by the question as indicated by the mark scheme. The meaning, however, should be unambiguous.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 4:

Rules must be applied consistently e.g. in situations where candidates have not followed instructions or in the application of generic level descriptors.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 5:

Marks should be awarded using the full range of marks defined in the mark scheme for the question (however; the use of the full mark range may be limited according to the quality of the candidate responses seen).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 6:

Marks awarded are based solely on the requirements as defined in the mark scheme. Marks should not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.

Assessment objectives (AOs)

AO1	Demonstrate knowledge and understanding; identify, select and apply ideas and concepts through the use of examples and evidence.	40%
AO2	Provide a systematic critical analysis of the texts and theories, sustain a line of argument and justify a point of view. Different views should be referred to and evaluated where appropriate. Demonstrate a synoptic approach to the areas studied.	60%

In the textual questions AO1 and AO2 are assessed separately.

AO1 and AO2 are both to be considered in assessing each essay.

The **Generic Marking Scheme** should be used to decide the mark. The essay should first be placed within a level which best describes its qualities, and then at a specific point within that level to determine a mark out of 25.

The **Question-Specific Notes** provide guidance for Examiners as to the area covered by the question. These question-specific notes are not exhaustive. Candidates may answer the question from a variety of angles with different emphases and using different supporting evidence and knowledge for which they receive credit according to the Generic Marking Scheme levels. However, candidates must clearly answer the question as set and not their own question. Examiners are reminded that the insights of specific religious traditions are, of course, relevant, and it is likely that candidates will draw on the views of Jewish, Christian or Islamic theologians, as well as those of philosophers who have written about the concept of God from a purely philosophical standpoint. There is nothing to prevent candidates referring to other religious traditions and these must, of course, be credited appropriately in examination responses.

Table A: Generic Marking Scheme for 10 mark questions

Level 5 9–10 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 7–8 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 5–6 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Reasonable attempt to use supporting evidence. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 3–4 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–2 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No relevant material to credit.

Table B: Generic Marking Scheme for 15 mark questions

Level 5 13–15 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 10–12 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 7–9 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 4–6 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–3 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Argument is limited or confused. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No relevant material to credit.

Table C: Generic Marking Scheme for 25 mark questions

<p>Level 5</p> <p>21–25 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
<p>Level 4</p> <p>16–20 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
<p>Level 3</p> <p>12–15 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
<p>Level 2</p> <p>8–11 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.

Level 1 1–7 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short.• Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic.• Argument is limited or confused.• Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question.• Limited attempt to use evidence.• Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• No relevant material to credit.

Question	Answer	Marks
1(a)	<p>With reference to the above passage, explain Berkeley's argument that 'sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit'.</p> <p>The extract is taken from the second of three Dialogues and finds the first presentation of Berkeley's 'non-sceptical' notion of a divine perceiver securing the continuing existence of an ideal, empirical reality. Two metaphysical theses are defended: immaterialism: the view that matter does not exist, and idealism: the view that reality is mind-dependent, or, more simply, that an object's <i>esse</i> is <i>percipi</i>. Students may well refer to some of the following or equivalent points:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The argument from pleasure and pain: that the 'objective' qualities of moderate warmth and excessive heat are reducible to the phenomenal properties of pleasure and pain (which are mind-dependent). • The argument from relativity: that the same object cannot entertain contradictory properties – what is hot to one hand, cold to the other; bitter to one person, sweet to another etc. • His critique of the primary/secondary quality distinction (a range of points is considered here): we cannot, for example, abstract the primary notion of shape from the secondary notion of [an expanse of] colour etc. • His 'master argument': that the thought of an unperceived/unconceived object entails both an empirical and conceptual contradiction (in essence, the thought of an unthought object is oxymoronic). • In arguing for the continuing existence of a perceiver-dependent reality, some 'other mind' remains the only viable option for the 'reality of sensible things'. This other mind is God. 	10
1(b)	<p>Critically examine the role of God in Berkeley's idealism.</p> <p>The varying degrees of success of several of the arguments raised in the (a)-part response to the question may be selected for critical discussion prior to analysing the role of God in Berkeley's philosophy.</p> <p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Problems with non-veridical perception: how, for example, Berkeley can account for illusions, hallucinations and other perceptual 'wildcards' without appealing to an external, material reality which our perceptions fail to correspond with (why God would deliberately mislead us etc.). • The general absurdity of Berkeley's position (Johnson's 'refutation' might feature here). • Despite its apparent absurdity, it might also be argued that Berkeley's position is also 'utterly irrefutable' (Hume). • A critique of the logically fallacious nature of his 'master argument': despite the fact that an object cannot be <i>thought of</i> outside of mind doesn't entail it cannot so <i>exist</i> (the same point presumably applies to the mind of God – Russell). • General problems surrounding solipsism and the problem of other minds (including God's mind). • Some candidates might discuss whether God rescues Berkeley or Berkeley God. • The most likely criticism is that Berkeley's principle falls upon its own sword. If 'to be is to be perceived', then who perceives God? 	15

Question	Answer	Marks
2	<p>‘Empiricism does not provide a successful account of our understanding of the world.’ Evaluate this claim.</p> <p>The question is quite permissive so that a range of points should be credited. Expect a general discussion of what empiricism entails. Arguments for empiricism will most likely draw on Locke and Hume (although Aristotle, Berkeley, Russell & Ayer would also be relevant). For the role of experience, an overview of Humean epistemology is likely to be given, for example, his account of the origin of ideas; his ‘copy’ principle; the role of the imagination; exceptions to Hume’s rule (his missing shade of blue example); his account of the principles of association; his ‘fork’ analogy and the sceptical implications of Hume’s account (many of these are discussed by Hume himself – cf the problem of induction etc.).</p> <p>A range of responses is expected and may include some of the following points:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Locke’s arguments against innate ideas and principles. For example, the absence of universal assent; the view that universal assent, if true, proves nothing innate; not on the mind ‘naturally imprinted’ since not known to children and idiots (etc.). • Hume’s arguments for the <i>tabula rasa</i> account of mind. For example, his ‘blind man’ example, his analysis of Adam in his original state and his own ‘colour blue’ counter example (etc.). • Reference to rationalist arguments against empiricism may be given but is not required for full marks. • Similarly, middle-ground positions may be referred to, so, for example, Leibniz’ ‘marble’ analogy; nativistic accounts of knowledge acquisition (Chomsky on deep grammar; facial recognition, depth perception etc.) and Kant on the synthetic <i>a priori</i> (‘empty’ concepts and ‘blind’ percepts etc.) in order to show that empiricism and rationalism are not mutually exclusive. • It might also be argued that none of the above accounts offer an adequate account of our epistemology and that global scepticism remains a tenable option. • Various other positions might also be considered. 	25

Question	Answer	Marks
3	<p>‘Neither coherentism nor reliabilism offers adequate justification for our beliefs about the world.’ Critically assess this view.</p> <p>Some candidates may address the issue directly. It would also be reasonable to contextualise the discussion, perhaps with reference to global scepticism, infinitism and foundationalism in order to assess whether the potentially malignant chain of inferential reasoning involved in the belief-forming process can be treated. Coherentism seeks to avoid such a regress by arguing for a holistic, non-linear account of justification whereby each belief in any given set (for example, ‘tomorrow is Thursday’) supports and is itself supported by other beliefs that co-exist alongside it (for example, ‘today is Wednesday’ and ‘Thursday follows Wednesday’). The justification process thus avoids the need for non-inferential justification since the individual members of each set offer mutual grounds of support for one another. It also avoids the regress problem since the beliefs themselves congruently feed back on one another, thus forming a ‘loop’ of justification. Individual accounts of what ‘coherence’ consists in <i>may</i> be critically considered. Given the synoptic nature of the Pre-U, it would be more than reasonable for candidates to draw on knowledge covered in other areas of study. For example, the ‘coherence of the senses’ (Locke, Berkeley, Russell, Ayer etc.) and/or of rational/mathematical systems (Descartes etc.). General criticisms of the view may refer to the ‘isolation’ objection: if beliefs are only supported by other beliefs in a system, then the umbilical-cord tethering belief to world is cut; the ‘plurality’ objection: in which internally coherent yet externally incompatible belief sets can co-exist and the ‘truth’ objection: the existence of (both real and manufactured) false yet consistent belief sets.</p> <p>Contrary to coherentism, reliabilism analyses justification in terms of ‘truth-conduciveness’, a reliable process being one which generates more true beliefs than false ones. The theory might be put forward as a response to the Gettier problem, in particular cases of ‘accidentally justified, true belief’. In its modern form, most accounts of reliabilism seek to ‘de-Gettierise’ such cases by appealing to ‘broad’ features of our mental states. More traditional ‘internalist’ candidates such as memory, perception and cognition would also be relevant here. General criticisms of the view may refer to the fact that reliable methods can still generate false beliefs; also, the fact that what might be reliable in one context (for example, a computer that only crashed once a year) might not be in another (an aeroplane that did so). Specific criticisms of particular accounts of reliabilism may also be referred to.</p> <p>It needs noting that the above positions are neither mutually exclusive, nor collectively exhaustive, so that a range of middle-ground or alternative positions might be argued for.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
4(a)	<p>With reference to this passage, explain Hare’s view that religious statements are non-cognitive <i>bliks</i>.</p> <p>Hare’s view is in response to Anthony Flew’s ‘falsificationist’ challenge to the meaningfulness of religious language. Hare defends religion by suggesting that it consists of a set of <i>bliks</i> (assumptions about the world). Everyone has a <i>blik</i>, and that <i>blik</i> determines the person’s other beliefs. The <i>blik</i> is not negotiable in any rational debate about evidence, and in some ways is beyond both reason and evidence, and this is clear from the behaviour of the lunatic’s <i>blik</i> about the murderous intentions of Oxford dons. That <i>blik</i> is compelling, and no amount of evidence to the contrary can counteract it. It is about the way a person sees things, and is non-cognitive. Most people have sane <i>bliks</i> (for example, I may have a <i>blik</i> that the steering of my car is defective because of poor-quality steel, and this <i>blik</i> is important to me because of the potential consequences; so no matter how often I arrive at my destination without killing someone, my <i>blik</i> will never be removed). A religious <i>blik</i> is a widespread view of the world, and equally, if I have one, then I am sincere in believing it, and the attempts of atheists or others will not make me change my mind.</p>	10
4(b)	<p>‘Hare’s theory of <i>bliks</i> solves none of the problems of religious language.’ Critically assess this claim.</p> <p>The problems of religious language include the issue of how religious statements are to be understood: are they cognitive/factual claims about the way the world really is, or non-cognitive assertions such as those envisaged by Hare, or else are they part of a language-game in the ways suggested by Wittgenstein? According to Flew, Hare solves nothing in the sense that <i>bliks</i> are unfalsifiable, and therefore meaningless: a statement such as: ‘God has a plan for the universe’, is a grand cosmological assertion, but since there is no conceivable evidence that might falsify it, it is meaningless. Some might argue that a religious <i>blik</i> is potentially verifiable at death, although if religious <i>bliks</i> are false, there can be no life after death in which the asserter knows that his assertions are false. Some might compare the merits of other approaches to religious language, for example, Braithwaite’s view that religious statements are conative, and reduce to the believer’s intention to act in accordance with religious moral principles – a claim that is potentially verifiable, since behaviour can be observed.</p> <p>Some might argue that religious believers are for the most part concerned to make cognitive statements about God, so Hare’s approach does not solve the problems of religious language.</p> <p>There are many possible routes to answering this question, so judge by relevance and quality of argument.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
5	<p>Critically examine the debate about the meaning of the word ‘good’ in moral statements.</p> <p>This is likely to be answered by analysing different meta-ethical approaches, as given in the specification, i.e. through ethical naturalism, non-naturalism and non-cognitivism. Ethical naturalism understands good as a complex factual property that can be analysed in terms of psychological states such as pleasure or happiness, so (for example) a Utilitarian understands the good in terms of pleasure, happiness or eudaimonia, whereas a Situation Ethicist (of the Fletcher persuasion) understands the good in terms of Jesus’ other-person-regarding <i>agape</i>-love. Some will reject naturalism on the ground that all such definitions vary too much to be accurate. Others will reject it on the basis of G E Moore’s argument that good is a simple, unanalysable term which cannot be defined or explained in more basic terms. For Moore, good is a factual property, but is non-natural, known self-evidently by a moral intuition. Intuitionist understandings of good might in turn be rejected on the grounds that people disagree about what is, or is not, self-evident (e.g. the rightness or wrongness of capital punishment).</p> <p>Moore further rejected naturalism on the grounds that we cannot derive moral values from facts: it is a mistake to define the concept ‘good’ in terms of some natural property such as ‘pleasant’ or ‘desirable’. This is by no means as obvious as Moore thinks, so some neo-naturalists insist that in order to be known at all, good <i>must</i> be located in the world of natural facts, for example, in the idea of ‘human flourishing’, since only the insane would not wish to flourish. Some will reject both naturalism and non-naturalism in favour of non-cognitivism, defining good in non-factual terms such as emotive judgements or moral prescriptions. Non-cognitivism might in turn be rejected on the grounds that it makes the concept of good trivial.</p> <p>Other lines of argument might analyse whether or not good is an absolute or relative feature, analysing various forms of moral absolutism and cultural relativism.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
6	<p>Evaluate the view that religious language is mythological.</p> <p>Answers to this might begin with a review of the nature of mythological language, for example, in terms of cosmogonic and aetiological myths about the origin and nature of the cosmos, designed to explain why the world is the way it is. Myths are not ‘untrue stories’, but are to some extent speculation about the central questions of existence: its origin and meaning. Myths are expressed in language which frequently refers to supernatural entities/gods and goddesses, since it was a common assumption in the ancient world that that the apparent order of nature is the product of unseen but real entities.</p> <p>Examples are likely to be taken from one or more of the world’s religions, and the claim that religious language is mythological might be justified by reference to the myths of creation and flood, and the fight with chaos, evidenced particularly in the biblical accounts in the books of Genesis, the Psalms and Job. The stories of creation and flood are re-presentations of earlier Babylonian myths, specifically the Enûma Eliš and the Epic of Gilgamesh. The latter in particular explores the themes of destruction and death that underpin the Genesis stories.</p> <p>The central assertion of the Christian religion, that Jesus of Nazareth was the Son of God, and was resurrected by God from death as an atonement for human sin, can be read as a re-presentation of the ‘myth of the dying and rising God’ seen in the literature of the Ancient Near East. The claim that religious language is mythological might therefore be justified on the basis that the biblical books are focused largely on the themes of sin, punishment, death and renewal. Against that, some will argue that religious language cannot be confined to a mythological interpretation. Text, literary and form criticism might be discussed as providing evidence for the wide variety of language types used in religious literature. Credit is given for all reasonable lines of interpretation, for example, that religious language is analogical or symbolical, cognitive/non-cognitive.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
7(a)	<p>With reference to this passage and to Hick’s ideas about pain and suffering, explain Hick’s argument about the positive value of mystery.</p> <p>Hick has been talking about pain and suffering, soul-making and mystery. It is not simply the degree of physical pain that causes us to suffer but also the mental suffering that such pain can cause us. Further, the distribution of suffering seems unjust: some live lives of luxury whereas others endure lives of torment. Despite his argument that a world with pain and suffering may be a better environment for developing moral personalities than a world sterilised of all challenges, Hick admits that the distribution of pain and suffering in the world appears to be random, and that some people suffer out of all proportion to what could be rationally intended.</p> <p>We ought to reject the belief that people suffer in proportion to their sins, just as we ought to reject the idea that suffering results from demonic malevolence (such as Satan). Nevertheless, Hick admits that he has no rational argument to replace such ideas other than to admit that undeserved suffering is a mystery. Perhaps, however, the mysteriousness of life is part of its character as a sphere of soul-making. If there were no unjust, undeserved or dysteleological misery, then we would always be able to justify our sufferings. If that were the case, then human misery could not evoke the deep sympathy of others, or the true compassion we feel for those who experience unmerited suffering. To have a world of compassionate love and self-giving for others, much of our suffering has to be apparently unmerited, pointless, and incapable of being morally rationalised. If all virtuous action were rewarded with happiness and all vice with punishment, then nobody would do right simply <i>because</i> it is right. What Kant called the good will does the right simply and solely because it is right, and Kant called this is the only intrinsically good thing in the world or out of it.</p> <p>In effect, the world that we now experience, with all its possibilities for undeserved suffering, is the kind of world that is compatible with the divine purpose of soul-making – of beings who are worthy to know God.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
7(b)	<p>Critically assess Hick’s claim that this world may be ‘a divinely-created sphere of soul-making’.</p> <p>Hick claims that unjustified suffering is necessary to bring about the intrinsic good of doing the right thing solely because it <i>is</i> right; but there is a difficulty here in that the problem of unjustified suffering seems to have a simpler solution, namely that God does not exist, so suffering has no existential solution beyond the normal experiences of beings such as ourselves: humans cannot control everything about their environment.</p> <p>Hick therefore concludes that the solution to the problem of unjustified suffering must be eschatological, meaning that it is justified by God’s purpose of eventual human fulfilment through soul-making. The Christian belief in an afterlife is necessary to Hick’s idea of soul-making, since Hick justifies the mystery of suffering by arguing that there are probably many levels of human existence after this one, by which souls will eventually come to understand what the whole process is all about. The Kingdom of Heaven in Christian teaching is a future triumphant state in which suffering of all kinds becomes intelligible to perfected souls.</p> <p>How convincing is all this? The idea <i>is</i> intelligible, but that alone does not make it likely. If all souls eventually come to know God, what has happened to the reality of the free choice to reject God? What of the immensity of animal suffering, to which Hick’s only response is that undeserved animal suffering also has to remain a mystery, because if we understood its causes then our freedom would be compromised? Does suffering have to be so extreme? Hick argues that if the boundaries of suffering were set lower, then the next level down of suffering would in turn become the extreme, but is that really the case? What about Dostoyevsky’s challenge in the ‘The Brothers Karamazov’ – is the whole process of soul-making really worth it in the end? From the comfortable seat of a theologian it might appear so, but what of the millions who have died in all sorts of pain and torment? Hick argues that Christian beliefs will be verified eschatologically, but if there is no life after death nothing will be verified, and, more importantly, the soul-making plans of God will never be falsified, because no-one will exist to falsify them.</p> <p>Accept other lines of argument that relate to soul-making. Judge by quality of evaluation.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
8	<p>Critically examine design arguments for the existence of God.</p> <p>The specification refers to ‘design arguments’, including the anthropic principle and the issue of so-called ‘intelligent design’. Most are likely to assess Paley’s version of the argument and perhaps those of Aquinas and Swinburne.</p> <p>A critical examination of Paley’s design argument is likely to take account of Hume’s critique of design arguments in general: for example, that the appearance of design might develop through some kind of Epicurean principle; or that there is a difference of degree between the perception of design in human artefacts and the perception of design in the universe as a whole, which functions more as an organism than as a machine. Hume’s objections concerning the nature and identity of a potential universe-designer include his point that the designer might be nothing like the God of Christian theism, so might be part of a design team (as would be required in the construction of a ship) rather than the work of an all-powerful God. Further objections are likely to be considered from Dawkins’ appeal to the theory of evolution as offering a scientific explanation for what we perceive as design.</p> <p>The anthropic principle might be used to defend the design argument (or as a version of it), on the grounds that the universal constants are set to incredibly narrow margins – they appear to be fine-tuned to produce intelligent observers. Alternatively, the fine-tuning argument might be rejected by employing multiverse theory to argue that there are so many universes in existence that some of them will have the universal constants set at the right levels purely by chance. Some might refer to the theory of ‘intelligent design’ from Michael Behe, although Behe’s arguments are near-universally dismissed in scientific circles. Judge through quality of argument and analysis.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
9	<p>Evaluate Hume’s arguments for rejecting miracles.</p> <p>Hume’s arguments against miracles are generally of two kinds. Both stem from his definition of a miracle as <i>a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent</i>. If we accept this definition, then it forms the basis of Hume’s main inductive argument against miracles. The testimony to miracles has to become more reliable in direct proportion to the improbability of what the witness claims to have observed. The more improbable the claim, then the more reliable the witness needs to be in order to be believed. The most improbable event would be a violation of natural laws, so a miracle must always be the least probable explanation of an event: it is always more likely that the witnesses are lying or mistaken. This argument is usually rejected on the grounds that it leaves Hume with nowhere to go if he really believed that he had witnessed a miracle. Moreover, whereas for Hume the improbability of miracles is the basis for rejecting them, for some religious people, the improbability of miracles is the basis for accepting them.</p> <p>Hume’s subsidiary arguments against miracles include, for example, his claim that they are the product of ignorant and barbarous nations (or of nations who had ignorant and barbarous ancestors); humans are naturally credulous, so are predisposed to believe in miracles; miracle stories are debunked by different miracle claims in different religions. Candidates are likely to assess some or all of these arguments. For example, he also claims that there have never been accounts of miracles from people of sufficient intelligence and integrity, yet he admits that the Roman historian Tacitus was perhaps the greatest genius in history, and was free of all credulity, so why should we reject Tacitus’ account of the miracles apparently done by the emperor Vespasian?</p> <p>Accept arguments that support or deny Hume’s conclusions, e.g. that miracle accounts are basically unscientific and deny the universal operation of the laws of cause and effect. Some are likely to point out that there is no universally accepted definition of miracles, so Hume’s arguments against them might be rejected if a different definition is given, e.g. one based on an anti-realist understanding.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
10(a)	<p>Examine the significance of this passage for an understanding of Jesus' resurrection.</p> <p>Matthew's resurrection account basically follows that of Mark rather than those of Luke or John. In Luke and John 20, the message of the angel and the appearances of Jesus take place in Jerusalem or its environs; in Matthew, the same message is given to the women by Jesus himself, following which they worship him, so the account is showing the status of Jesus as worthy of worship following the resurrection. Matthew omits Mark's reference to the spices used for anointing Jesus' body. There are several areas on which candidates might comment, for example, the testimony of the women: Matthew emphasises this, which according to some would be surprising (Paul omits it in 1 Corinthians 15), the implication being that the account was true. Matthew has no account of the actual resurrection of Jesus, but he includes the account of the precautions taken by the Pharisees to guard against fraudulent claims by Jesus' disciples, who might steal Jesus' body, which appears to be a real account of an ongoing dispute concerning the resurrection between the Jewish authorities and the followers of Jesus. Candidates might mention the physicality of Jesus (v.9 – they took hold of his feet) – this is resurrection of the body, with all that this implies. Some might comment on the mythological nature of the writing, including the 'descent' of the angel of the Lord from heaven.</p> <p>Some might consider the significance of this passage for different groups and times; also the theological significance of the passage, for example, in the debate about life after death and its nature.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
10(b)	<p>‘The narratives of Jesus’ resurrection show that he rose from the dead.’ Critically assess this claim.</p> <p>Candidates might, or might not, confine their answers to Matthew’s Gospel. Candidates are likely to refer to some of the points referred to in connection with Matthew’s account, particularly the dispute with the Jewish authorities concerning the possibility that the disciples stole Jesus’ body in order to perpetuate a false story that Jesus had survived death. Some might point to the various discrepancies between the Gospel accounts as an indication of invention, or else as an indication of acceptable and common variation in testimony. Some might emphasise the differences between the Synoptics and John, e.g. where in John’s Gospel the Last Supper is not the Passover meal, but occurs before it. The ‘lost ending’ of Mark’s Gospel might feature in some analyses – the fact that the text appears to finish with Mark’s comment that the women said nothing to anyone because they were afraid. In Mark and Matthew, Galilee features as the focus of much of what takes place, whereas in Luke the focus is around Jerusalem. Some might refer to the supposed mythological background of the resurrection narratives in the ‘myth of the dying and rising God’, although much of this is contested.</p> <p>The range of possible answers is extensive – for example, some might put the discussion into the wider context of the 1st–2nd century debate about who Jesus was. Others may look at the continuity with the Old Testament tradition: for example, the narratives of Jesus meeting with some of his followers (Matthew 28:9–10, 16–20) are reminiscent of Old Testament theophanies such as Genesis 18, Exodus 3 & Judges 6.</p> <p>Candidates do not have to reach a decision as to whether or not Jesus rose from the dead: responses are judged by quality of reasoning and evidence.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
11	<p>Evaluate the claim that Jesus’ miracles are about fact, not faith.</p> <p>Miracle stories were common in the ancient world, and the Old Testament miracle stories provide a clear backdrop for understanding the miracle stories in the New Testament. In the Old Testament, the miracle-worker is Elijah, who multiplies food miraculously and raises the widow’s son to life (1 Kings 17). In Luke 7, Jesus raises the Widow of Nain’s son from death – an early miracle which appears to cement his credentials as being greater than Elijah, who subsequently appears at Jesus’ Transfiguration to represent Prophecy. In the miracle of the feeding of the 5000, Jesus multiplies bread and fish, so shows himself to be the miracle worker par excellence. The religious context of this function is to show that Jesus is the Messiah who was expected to restore the Kingdom of Israel, to feed the hungry and to perform miracles, so Jesus demonstrates his credentials as the Messiah. In John’s Gospel, the miracles are ‘signs’ of God’s power and eschatological purpose. Some interpret the ‘facts’ to be now-unrecoverable events which were subsequently reinterpreted through the faith of the Early Church.</p> <p>Candidates are likely to look at a range of Jesus’ miracles, e.g. the healings and the miracles over nature. Many of these have layers of symbolism which would have offered important signs for the Early Church, e.g. the calming of the storm, where the narrative is reminiscent of the creation narratives where God’s power organises pre-existent chaos. With Jesus, such power would be seen to be able to overcome any disaster, such as persecution of the early Christian community. Some might conclude that there does not need to be a choice between ‘fact’ and ‘faith’, since both factors might be present in the miracle narratives. Certainly having faith is a prerequisite for many of Jesus’ healing miracles, so perhaps they show that the facts of healing followed upon the faith of the individual.</p> <p>The essay title allows for some analysis of the philosophy of miracles, since Christians disagree about whether Jesus’ miracles should be seen as factual or symbolic, real or anti-real. All relevant lines of discussion are accepted.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
12	<p>Critically examine teachings in the gospels about discipleship.</p> <p>This is a very broad-based question. Some might begin with a definition of a disciple as a learner or pupil – someone who follows in the footsteps of a teacher. Discipleship is focal in the Gospel tradition, beginning with the recruitment of the first disciples. During these narratives, discipleship is shown to demand full commitment, to the extent that when Peter, James and John encountered Jesus through the miracle of the great catch of fish (Luke 5), they simply left everything and followed Jesus.</p> <p>Discipleship also forms the end-command in Matthew’s Gospel, for example, where Jesus instructs his disciples to go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything they will be taught. The idea is to perpetuate Jesus’ teaching through ‘devolved’ discipleship.</p> <p>‘Teaching’ here is catechesis – technically the process of educating through a process of question and response. By teaching, the Church becomes an extension of Jesus’ ministry, and Jesus is the model in terms of his life and commitment. The cost of discipleship is therefore emphasised heavily: in Luke 9:23, Jesus says to everybody: ‘If any man wants to come after me, then let him deny himself and take up his cross daily and follow me.’ In other words, the requirements of discipleship show no limits. Speaking literally or figuratively, Jesus tells those who want to follow him to give up home, family and wealth – even to turn back in order to say goodbye shows a lack of the commitment needed. The reward is to sit by Jesus in the Messianic Banquet in heaven. Some might refer to specific teachings showing the need for commitment over and above the normal – for example, in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5–7), where Jesus tells his hearers that although they have heard it said that they must not commit murder, the precursor of murder is angry thoughts, so a disciple must not think angry thoughts. Equally, to avoid adultery, disciples must not think lustful thoughts. Some might argue that this kind of commitment is required because Jesus believed that God’s final Kingdom was imminent, so the ethical standards of the disciples of Christ have to match up to that expectation.</p> <p>Some might argue that the New Testament itself is inauthentic, so Jesus’ teaching on discipleship may have no cognitive content, or else could be a read-back from the teachings of the developed Church.</p>	25