HISTORY

Paper 3 Interpretations Question

No Additional Materials are required.

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

An answer booklet is provided inside this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

This paper contains three sections:
Section A: Topic 1 The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c. 1850–1939
Section B: Topic 2 The Holocaust
Section C: Topic 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

Answer the question on the topic you have studied.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.
The marks are given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question.
An imperial ideology, a potent mixture of patriotism, excitement in adventure and colonial warfare, reverence for the monarchy, admiration for military virtues, and a quasi-religious approach to the obligations of world-wide power, came to dominate many aspects of, especially, popular culture. Throughout society, events in the Empire turned patriotism into jingoism, ethnic self-regard into outright racism, and self-righteousness into extreme aggression.

Nevertheless, historians have continued to be sceptical of the notion that imperial ideas and enthusiasms penetrated deeply into the consciousness of the British public. Many societies, such as those connected with Imperial Federation in the 1880s, were short-lived and unsuccessful. Voters were influenced by hard-headed domestic concerns: the Imperial Preference issue seemed to demonstrate that colonial sentiment was likely to be subordinated to anxieties about more expensive food. Emigration patterns to 1914 show that the United States was more attractive than the Dominions and colonies. Men were seldom eager to enlist in the army except when driven to it by unemployment and economic distress.

Yet the cultural expressions of Empire were undoubtedly highly pervasive. The framers of British culture were unlikely to adopt what was unfavourable to the populace. Imperial culture almost certainly represented a powerful interaction among the classes, illustrated in the eagerness of the suppliers of entertainment and popular literature, commercial advertisers, and the founders of youth organisations to attach themselves to it. The public, largely uninterested in specific imperial principles and policies, were nonetheless fascinated by Empire’s existence, its racial connotations, and the superior self-image which it offered in respect of the rest of the world. Imperial ideology was a significant aspect of late nineteenth-century nationalism.

Empire also represented an area of convergence, not only between ‘high’ and popular culture, but also among the political parties. Although politicians hotly debated imperial issues, they tended to come together on fundamental aspects of imperial and patriotic rhetoric. The Liberals produced a group of influential Liberal Imperialists. The Labour Party promoted ethical imperialism rather than anti-imperialism. Even the radical left was initially imperialist.

There are perhaps several powerful – and heretofore largely unnoticed – reasons for this: the existence of structures for disseminating imperial ideas and images, the exceptionally long period over which they had been entering the British consciousness, their recognised role in consolidating the British state, and the opportunities they presented for a national common ground (however fraught individual issues might be). Hence, moments of imperial and domestic danger tended to produce warlike responses heavily laden with imperial rhetoric. From the late eighteenth century, the public encountered ideas about the Empire through news of overseas successes (and reverses), heroic journeys, and the appearance of exotic people in their midst. The theatre repeatedly tackled imperial themes. Many also heard of such issues from Christian preachers. Others – seamen, traders and soldiers, for example – often had at least a passing experience of Empire at first hand.

In the nineteenth century the media expanded considerably: the theatre, sermons, tracts, and visual materials such as panoramas were joined by an illustrated press, social campaigns associated with Empire, exhibitions in churches, mechanics’ institutions and local museums, the music hall, national exhibitions in London and elsewhere, local societies, the schools, youth organisations, juvenile literature and journals, and many other forms of entertainment and advertising. Of course, work, family, income, health, and daily survival loomed largest for most people in Britain, but nonetheless Empire constituted a vital aspect of national identity and race-consciousness, even if complicated by regional, rural, urban, and class contexts.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]
Read the extract and then answer the question.

In addition to biological differences between men and women which, to a large extent, defined the nature of their experiences, gender-based socialisation accounts for a variety of subtle behaviours that may have positioned women to recognise what was happening to the Jews. Women had been socialised to use their domestic skills to improve their living conditions and, even in the concentration camps, men had to learn behaviours that women already knew. Most women describe situations in which they confronted their new reality and devised strategies that actively engaged them in fighting for their survival. Essentially, as women cleaned their surroundings, sewed pockets into their ragged clothes, imagined menus to fight against their hunger, nursed and nurtured one another, they created the illusion of taking some measure of both control and responsibility for their well-being. In these efforts, they worked collaboratively and, in doing so, imparted a sense of being needed by others. I want to emphasise that survival was more a matter of luck than anything else. Still, most women in twentieth-century Europe were socialised to perform in the private sphere – the home – to be a nurturer and caregiver and be proficient in daily chores, and these learned characteristics may have enhanced their chances of survival. According to many memoirs, nurturing was indeed a significant element in survival. It led to both feeling and being needed in concrete ways, such as sharing a morsel of bread, seeking members of the family for mutual sustenance, and building substitute families to restore the sense in oneself of being an integral member of a group. These connections helped negate the anonymity of the concentration and labour camp systems, and to balance the humiliation designed to break the spirit and the will.

Gender difference is also conspicuous in the inmates’ response to, and memory of, hunger. Even before they were sent to the camps, both male and female Jews were subjected to starvation in the ghettos. In labour and concentration camps, sharing their memories of wonderful meals eaten in better times was a diversion for both women and men. But in a close examination of both men’s and women’s memoirs, I found a striking difference in the way they spoke about food and hunger. In men’s memoirs, hunger was usually rooted in the stomach and in the memory; they evoked their meals – usually their mother’s cooking – that they had enjoyed in a state of freedom. Men spoke and wrote about their hunger and distress, and confessed their willingness to do just about anything to alleviate that hunger. Thus, for them, starvation was a manifestation of Nazi power, and their hunger was devastating proof of their own vulnerability and dependency. In women’s memoirs, hunger is just as devastating a presence as in men’s, but often it evokes a different type of response, one rooted in the imagination, situated in the kitchen, and remembered through conversations with sister prisoners. As they recalled their domestic roles of pre-Nazi days, women created communities that grew out of sharing recipes and food-preparation experiences. In describing to another prisoner the food they once cooked, they shared an experience familiar to both of them, an experience that connected them to another person and briefly broke the isolation and despair brought on by hunger. Thus for many women, hunger led to a social relationship, just as food preparation had created and defined social relationships for women before the Nazi era. These positive reminders of their past status contributed to their emotional strength.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]
Read the extract and then answer the question.

Would an American offer in 1945 of sharing atomic secrets have made the Russians less suspicious, more humane in their policies in Eastern Europe? This is implicit in revisionists’ writings, since it is not part of their argument that the Soviets were entirely blameless in Eastern Europe, or that the governments they set up there represented exactly the will of the people. They explain Soviet repressions as an understandable overreaction to American atomic blackmail. But had the Soviets not been afraid of the atomic bomb, would not Stalin have asked for more rather than less? Could Stalin’s fears have been appeased by a firm agreement on spheres of influence between the two superpowers? This argument has some validity, but with the war over it was simply impossible for public opinion in the West to remain indifferent to the tales of repression, violence and destruction that were pouring in from the East. Could ‘tougher’ policies have worked? Total American dominance was very close to being a reality both because of the fantastic record of American industry and production during the war, and secondly because of the vast American manpower. As against it, Russia’s economy was in ruins and Stalin faced his own people with their expectations, which were to be cruelly disappointed, that their sacrifices had won them the right to a better and freer life than they had had before the war. But the USA could not embark on an aggressive foreign policy in 1945. The main concern of US policymakers was not to deny Russia the fruits of victory, but to prevent the American people from lapsing back into isolationism when faced with the complexities of the post-war world.

However, within the limits defined by the characteristics of both societies, there was still a great deal that skilful, well-informed and alert diplomacy could have accomplished. But on the Polish issue, a key one in inter-Allied diplomacy between 1943 and 1945, the Western leaders and their diplomatic advisers were abysmally ignorant. They simply could not keep up with Stalin, who was excellently informed and who could lie outrageously without any of the Allies catching on. A careful study of the Tehran Conference will bear out the conclusion that, on Poland, the Soviets were offered more than they expected. Soviet diplomacy was alert and tenacious. It perceived and exploited the West’s fears and intentions. At Yalta the Russians diagnosed carefully the exaggerated importance attached by the Americans to the framework of the United Nations. The Russians would raise objections concerning membership, procedures etc, and then drop them in a manner that would earn American gratitude, and leave them feeling it would now be embarrassing to quibble over Poland or German reparations. Soviet diplomacy was not superhuman, nor were the Russians rigid in their thinking. On the German issue, for example, it is obvious that in 1945 they were not clear in their own mind what they wanted, what kind of Germany would eventually serve their interests best. But American diplomacy was already working in fits and starts, already asking unanswerable questions. Was Soviet Russia out to conquer the world, or was Stalin going to abide by the spirit of the United Nations? There were a great number of possibilities and opportunities between these alternatives, but they were ignored. American international relations were therefore launched on a course of grandiose anti-Soviet rhetoric, overlooking those occasions where tenacious, well-informed diplomacy could have made a difference, and where hard bargaining rather than posturing might have brought partial solutions and lowered international tension.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]