READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

If you have been given an Answer Booklet, follow the instructions on the front cover of the Booklet. Write your Centre number, candidate number and name on the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black pen.
Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid.

This paper contains three sections:
Section A: Topic 1 The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c. 1850–1939
Section B: Topic 2 The Holocaust
Section C: Topic 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–50

Answer the question on the topic you have studied.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.
Section A: Topic 1
The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939

Read the extract and then answer the question.

The character of the Empire is portrayed through the forgotten officials and governors, without whom it would not have survived more than a few weeks. I have not written one of those books that purport to show that the Empire was a good or a bad thing. I have simply sought to enter, as best I could, into the mentality of the Empire’s rulers, to describe their thoughts and ideals and values. I argue that officials wielded immense powers, and that it was this that ultimately led to disorder and even chaos.

 Officials often developed one line of policy, only for their successors to overturn it and pursue a completely different approach. This was a source of chronic instability in many parts of the Empire. In many ways the British were too individualistic, and the vagaries of democratic politics meant that a consistent line was seldom adopted. I have called this ‘anarchic individualism’, as there was often nothing to stop ‘the man on the spot’, as he was called by Colonial Office officials, from pursuing the course of action he thought best. As with Nigeria, where Lord Lugard dominated the scene, powerful individuals directed imperial policy with little supervision from Whitehall. Such a system was ultimately anarchic and self-defeating, as policies developed over the years in Nigeria, Sudan, Hong Kong and elsewhere were simply put aside when a new governor took his place.

These reversals of policy show that the Empire was an intensely pragmatic affair. Apart from a common educational background and a sense of shared style, individual governors and officials had a wide range of interests and beliefs. Some were motivated by a strong evangelical Christianity, others were outright atheists; some were highly conservative, while others were more liberal, even radical. What bound these people together was a very similar educational background, which leads inevitably to the notion of class.

Class was central to the British Empire. The Empire was extremely hierarchical. In each colony, there were highly detailed tables of precedent, which showed exactly where everyone stood in the pecking order. It is a mistake to think that administrators were motivated by liberal ideas of democracy. In many cases they chose careers in the Empire precisely because they were not democrats. They were elitists, men who could write Latin and Greek and had sought to wield power without having to go through the inconvenience of being elected. The Empire stood for order and the rule of law, but we must not pretend that its character was something other than what it was. The Empire was not simply a forerunner of the modern pluralist democracy, so valued in the West. It was something entirely different. It is simply misleading to describe the Empire, as one historian has done, as the champion of ‘free-market liberalism’ and democracy. Such a judgement pays too little attention to what the Empire was really like, or to the ideas of those people who actually administered it. Notions of democracy could not have been further from the minds of the imperial administrators themselves. Their heads were filled with ideas of ‘class’, of intellectual superiority and of paternalism. ‘Benign authoritarianism’ would be a better description of the political philosophy sustained by the Empire.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]
Section B: Topic 2
The Holocaust

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

No-one knows when Hitler gave the order to annihilate the Jews. No written document has ever been discovered. Clues from various sources indicate that sometime in the spring of 1941 Hitler gave a personal order to Himmler that the Jews had to be eliminated. It is also highly likely that Hitler even suggested the precise nature of getting rid of the Jews – extermination by poison gas. After all, he had made allusions to this since the early days of the Party; and in Mein Kampf, he wrote that many German lives would have been saved in World War I if ‘these Hebrew corruptors of people had been subjected to poison gas.’

As will be recalled, Hitler had publicly warned the Jews on 30 January 1939 that he would annihilate them in case of war. When World War II began, Hitler learned that Chaim Weizmann, head of the world Zionist movement, had written a letter to Prime Minister Chamberlain, published in the Jewish Chronicle of 8 September 1939, in which he declared that the Jews would be fighting on the side of Britain and the democracies. Hitler seems to have not only regarded this statement as a declaration of war by the Jews on Germany, but also seized on it as a rationale for interning Jews as Germany’s enemies. As late as 24 July 1942 Hitler personally referred to Weizmann’s letter in reminding his dinner guests that in World War II ‘one should never forget that world Jewry, after its declaration of war by the Zionist Congress and its leader Chaim Weizmann, was National Socialism’s enemy number 1.’ It is interesting to note that when Hitler made this and other remarks about the Jews, he never revealed what was actually done to them. When he made this reference to Weizmann, Hitler was still maintaining the illusion that the Jews were being deported eastward or that he would pack them off to Madagascar.

Apparently some concern for possible public reaction, combined with a mania for secrecy and perhaps some psychological need to keep this atrocity at a distance, kept Hitler from revealing the awful secret and his role in it to anyone but a few trusted henchmen (Himmler, Goebbels, Bormann, Goering). But the fact is that Hitler had been step-by-step the guiding spirit of what happened to the Jews since he gained power in 1933.

From various statements by Hitler and his close subordinates between the spring and winter of 1941, we can trace the planning of the ‘Final Solution’ with reasonable accuracy. On 3 March 1941, Hitler issued a directive for the impending war on Russia that insisted, among other things, that ‘the Bolshevik/Jewish intelligentsia must be eliminated.’ On 2 April, Alfred Rosenberg had a two-hour meeting with Hitler during which he learned of the scope of mass exterminations already committed and still planned in the eastern territories. He appears to have been so stunned that he could only write down in his diary: ‘What I do not write down today I will none the less never forget.’ In the summer of 1941, Himmler called Rudolf Hoess, commandant of the Auschwitz concentration camp, to Berlin and told him: ‘The Führer has ordered that the Jewish question be solved once and for all and that we, the SS, are to implement that order. Himmler then spelled out that ‘every Jew that we can lay our hands on is to be destroyed now during the war, without exception.’

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]
Read the extract and then answer the question that follows.

The Soviets’ ignorance of the way in which American policy was made and their inexperience in international diplomacy multiplied their misconceptions. Likewise the Americans who, although adept at elaborating their own proposals, were quite unprepared when they ran into Soviet objections. Washington never tried to see the problems from Moscow’s point of view. Its sources of information in the Soviet Union were poor and it only had the haziest notion of policy discussions in the Kremlin. It took some time before the West realised that Stalin was not under enormous pressure from more hard-line colleagues in the communist Politburo. It then dawned on Western policy-makers that there was one decision-maker in the Kremlin and he brooked no opposition.

In 1945 the Americans genuinely wanted cooperation based on mutual advantage. Why, then, did Stalin not make more of the opportunities offered? It may have been the acute awareness of Soviet economic weakness and American strength which led Stalin to adopt a safety-first policy. If the ‘open world’ economy came into being, American influence might well replace that of the Soviets in the latter’s sphere of influence. As the hope of American credits on terms acceptable to the Soviet Union receded, so the Soviet need for increased reparations mounted. Yet the increasingly acrimonious discussions on the problem of Germany (including reparations) merely strengthened the hand of those Americans who were committed to the ‘Riga Axioms’ – a belief in the fundamentally expansionist nature of Soviet communism. American policy consequently became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Soviets, it was argued, did not want an agreement since they were bent on expansion. Give them eastern and south-eastern Europe and they would start asking for countries in the west. Containment was the logical response to this. It was enunciated in February 1946 but only openly became official policy a year later, with the formulation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. These were necessary to construct the edifice of the Cold War, because they provided the United States with a world mission apparently based on Wilsonian idealism – yet one which, at the same time, promised to create the overseas markets necessary for the rapid expansion of the US economy.

Western fear of the Soviet Union played an important part in the origins of the Cold War. There were people such as General Clay who raised their voices against the prevailing wisdom, but in vain. They saw the Soviet Union for what it was, economically and militarily weak. Official misconceptions about the Soviet Union’s real strength mainly stemmed from ignorance of the Soviet Union, and here the Soviet obsession with secrecy was counter-productive.

In 1945 agreement could have been reached, but in 1946 it became much more difficult. The longer the powers haggled, the more pressing became the problem of what to do about war-shattered Germany. In London and Washington there was an increasing desire for a rapid revival of the German economy, since Britain was unable and the United States was unwilling to sustain it for much longer. This was bound to raise concern in Moscow. In fact, it was in everyone’s interests to reach an agreement on Germany, for once that had been achieved, accord on other parts of the world could follow. Nevertheless, such was the importance of Germany to both sides that no one was willing to leave a vacuum. Each side feared that Germany would pass into the camp of its adversary. Eventually, the only solution to the intractable European problem was to divide the continent into blocs and revitalise the Western economies as the surest way of resisting communism.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]
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