## Generic levels of response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Score Range</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 5</td>
<td>25–30</td>
<td>Responses show very good understanding of the question and contain a relevant, focused and balanced argument, fully supported by appropriate factual material and based on a consistently analytical approach. Towards the top of the level, responses might be expected to be analytical, focused, and balanced throughout. The candidate will be in full control of the argument and will reach a supported judgement in response to the question. Towards the lower end of the level, responses might typically be analytical, consistent and balanced, but the argument might not be fully convincing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4</td>
<td>19–24</td>
<td>Responses show a good understanding of the question and contain a relevant argument based on a largely analytical approach. Towards the top of the level, responses are likely to be analytical, balanced and effectively supported. There may be some attempt to reach a judgement but this may be partial or unsupported. Towards the lower end of the level, responses are likely to contain detailed and accurate factual material with some focused analysis, but the argument is inconsistent or unbalanced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>13–18</td>
<td>Responses show understanding of the question and contain appropriate factual material. The material may lack depth. Some analytical points may be made but these may not be highly developed or consistently supported. Towards the top of the level, responses contain detailed and accurate factual material. However attempts to argue relevantly are implicit or confined to introductions and conclusions. Alternatively, responses may offer an analytical framework which contains some supporting material. Towards the lower end of the level, responses might offer narrative or description relating to the topic, but are less likely to address the terms of the question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>7–12</td>
<td>Responses show some understanding of the demands of the question. They may be descriptive with few links to the question or may be analytical with limited relevant factual support. Towards the top of the level, responses might contain relevant commentaries which lack adequate factual support. The responses may contain some unsupported assertions. Towards the lower end of the level, responses are likely to contain some information which is relevant to the topic but may only offer partial coverage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>1–6</td>
<td>Responses show limited understanding of the question. They may contain some description which is linked to the topic or only address part of the question. Towards the top of the level, responses show some awareness of relevant material but this may be presented as a list. Towards the lower end of the level, answers may provide a little relevant material but are likely to be characterised by irrelevance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No relevant, creditworthy content.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Indicative content

1 How far had Lenin established a Marxist state in Russia by 1924? [30]

The key issue is the link between Lenin’s government and Marxism. Lenin was a self-proclaimed Marxist. His professed aims were to destroy the existing policies and economic systems, to be replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariat. Capitalism would give way to Marxist socialism. Lenin did destroy existing political systems. However, his dictatorship was the antithesis of Marx’s ideals. Tsarist monarchy gave way to a republic. The aristocracy was ended as was Russia’s small middle class. The power of the Church was destroyed in an atheist Russia. However, power was held by the few, not the many. Russia was highly centralised with no appearance of democracy. Terror was widespread, including the use of the Cheka. Only the official Communist Party was allowed. In the economy, Lenin introduced War Communism (1919–1921), a development that some believe was more political than a reaction to the civil war. It involved state control at all levels. Banks and industries were nationalised. Peasants came under central direction, exerted through local government-appointed officials. The failure of War Communism was soon apparent to Lenin, although others in the Party wished to continue it on ideological grounds. The New Economic Policy saw a reversal to some private enterprise although the heights of the economy were still run by the state.

2 How far had Mussolini achieved his aims in domestic policy by 1939? [30]

The key issue is the achievement of Mussolini’s aims in domestic policy only. Discussion of foreign affairs will not be relevant. The end date of 1939 precludes studies of a later period.

It might be argued that Mussolini’s most important aim was to gain and secure personal power. His programme was to impose an extreme right-wing government on Italy and to carry out political, economic and social reforms that would reflect this. In 1924, his Fascists won a large majority but he went further to crush the opposition. The Fascists were probably responsible for the murder of Matteotti, a socialist leader. This was a part of the violence used by Mussolini’s supporters such as the Blackshirts. Representatives of other political groups withdrew from the Chamber of Deputies (the Aventine Secession), giving Mussolini a free hand. In 1925 he gained complete power and used it to curb the trade unions, much of the press and independent judicial officials. However, his search for complete control was modified by a realistic willingness to compromise with the powerful papacy; hence the Lateran Treaties (1929). He co-operated with big business but also carried through large-scale public works, for example building new towns and draining the Pontine Marshes. By 1939, the largest industrial enterprises were state run. To a large extent, Mussolini had achieved his aims of a Corporative State.

Mussolini did assert personal primacy in Italy. He was a showman who embraced the media and was happy in public appearances, an effective orator. However, the practical gains were exaggerated by propaganda. The lower classes benefited from some state-controlled activities such as holiday camps but their standard of living was hardly improved. The trains did run on time – or at least the international expresses did when local railway services had to give way. A number of agricultural reforms had limited success, for example the battle of grain when unsuitable land was brought under cultivation. Inflation remained high. Censorship was not complete. Critics who kept the expression of their opinions within check escaped major persecution. There was little organised anti-Semitism before 1939.
3 Why was Stalin able to establish his dictatorship in Russia? [30]

The key issue is Stalin’s establishment of his dictatorship. Stalin used his position as General Secretary of the Communist Party to control appointments even during Lenin’s last years when the latter became less active. As Secretary, Stalin managed the complete structure of administration and therefore government from the lowest to high posts. It is possible that Lenin and Trotsky planned to remove Stalin but Lenin’s death gave Stalin his opportunity. He outwitted Trotsky and represented himself as Lenin’s heir. Stalin used helpful allies to gain power, for example Kamenev, Zinoviev and Bukharin. Trotsky was hounded out and critics or those who were accused of opposing Stalin were persecuted as Trotskyites. He was then ruthless in destroying those who had helped him to achieve his autocratic position. A succession of purges culminated in the show trials of 1936–1938. The purges involved not only political figures but people from many fields, including the Communist Party and the military. This increased Stalin’s dictatorship beyond all previously known bounds in Russia. The NKVD was given targets that were out of proportion with any real opposition. Propaganda conveyed the image of a genial and successful leader who was responsible for all of the USSR’s (often exaggerated) achievements. Russian history was studied through books which were attributed to Stalin. Radio and newspapers underlined Stalin’s reputation. Candidates can deal with a variety of social and economic policies but these should be linked to his dictatorship.

4 How accurately can Hitler’s government of Germany from 1933 to 1939 be described as totalitarian? [30]

The key issue is the study of Hitler’s government as totalitarian. The question asks ‘Why’ and the best responses will be analytical in approach and should attempt to explain ‘totalitarian’ specifically. Others might deal with this implicitly, including assumptions that totalitarianism was synonymous with political dictatorship.

Totalitarian is generally used to describe a regime that tries to control all aspects of life, not only political government but also the economy, religion, thought and culture. It is commonly associated with extreme forms of propaganda and terror. The Enabling Laws gave Hitler dictatorial powers. Other parties were suppressed. Hitler as Führer was all-powerful. (Some answers might refer to Führer Law or the Führer Principle.) The Concordat (1933) with the Papacy went as far as Hitler dared to control religion. (Not as far as Stalin but further than Mussolini.) The rights that were negotiated with the Roman Catholic Church were widely disregarded. An attempt was made to set up a Nazi Church but with little success. The economy was directed centrally. Private industry continued but served the interests of the state and increasingly the military demands of Hitler. Independent trade unions were suppressed and much was made of the small concessions to the workers of free holidays that camouflaged the real nature of working conditions. Nazi models dominated all forms of culture (while the hierarchy pilfered foreign art that was officially disapproved of). Propaganda promoted the idea of Hitler as a supreme and all-powerful leader. Real or suspected critics were dealt with by the SS and Gestapo. Their courts, if used, were outside the responsibility of normal courts but even these were presided over by compliant judges. Minorities, especially the Jews, were treated harshly. Reference might be made to the Nuremberg Laws (1935) and Kristallnacht (1938).
Indicative content

5 Why, after 30 years of economic growth, did the USA experience such severe economic problems in the 1970s? [30]

The economic problems of the 1970s can be summarised in one word: stagflation. In other words, on one side economic growth was stagnant and unemployment rising while on the other, inflation was increasing. Stagflation most accurately applies to the second half of the 1970s and to 1974–1975 in particular. The long-term cause of stagflation in the 1970s was the decline in the US dominance of the capitalist world. Firstly, other countries such as Japan and West Germany were starting to compete with the USA, helped by a US commitment to free trade via GATT. For the first time in many decades, the USA imported more goods than it sold abroad. From 1970, when the US first relied on foreign imports of oil, the cartel of oil-producing countries (OPEC) was also able to challenge US dominance. Secondly, the Cold War involved the USA in heavy overseas expenditures, the greatest of which was the Vietnam War. At the same time, LBJ's Great Society gave welfare benefits to many Americans, which affected federal budgets. These were more short-term, political factors which explained the economic difficulties of the 1970s. The USA was trying to have both guns and butter, which imposed great strains on its economy. Furthermore, the US government could not risk paying for these by increasing taxes. It went into debt. Overseas countries turned their plentiful dollars into gold – at a fixed price. The gold-dollar standard had fixed the price of gold at $35 per ounce. The USA began to run out of gold. In 1971 it ended the standard which had underpinned the international economy since 1945. The pressures caused a recession in the early 1970s and stagflation a few years later, as the first oil crisis of 1973 caused further inflation in the USA. Governments tried to balance the need to reduce inflation, which meant more financial and monetary restrictions, with the need to reduce unemployment, which required fewer restrictions. The combination of a stagnant economy and rapid inflation was one which US governments had not met before. They struggled. The US people suffered.

6 How valid is the assertion that the USA experienced greater social change in the 1950s than it did in the 1960s? [30]

The 1960s would seem to be the time of greater social change than the 1950s. The 1960s saw the dramatic appearance of ‘baby boomer’ youths in colleges and at great open air concerts such as Woodstock in 1969. Films such as Bonnie and Clyde (1967) and Easy Rider (1969) were further evidence of a new youth culture. The behaviour of these students was in marked contrast to that of their predecessors in the 1950s. As well as students, women of the 1960s were also challenging traditional orthodoxies in both public and private lives. The start of ‘second wave feminism’ is usually dated from 1963, when Betty Friedan’s book The Feminine Mystique was published. In 1966 the National Organisation of Women was formed. By the end of the 1960s homosexuality was being more openly discussed. In 1969 the Stonewall Riots occurred in New York and in 1970 the first ‘gay pride’ rally took place in San Francisco. The increased political activism of African Americans, especially in the inner cities, also reflected the changing social position of black people.

In the 1950s, women and gays attracted little public attention. Since the war, many women had married and were expected to stay at home and raise their children. At least from the mid-1950s and the emergence of rock and roll, the young did make their presence felt. Greater personal freedom aided by the prosperity of the decade and the expansion of college education resulted in social change which continued in the 1960s, if on a greater scale. In terms of minority groups, the great social change of the 1950s concerned African Americans, especially in the South. The economic prosperity of the 1950s resulted in social change in that it helped to expand the middle class, allowing them to move to suburbs and new towns. This social change was less dramatic than that of the 1960s but it was still significant.
7 How far did the power of the presidency grow between 1945 and 1979? [30]

1973 saw the publication of historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr’s book *The Imperial Presidency* in which he argued that modern presidents had become more akin to emperors. He argued that the power of the presidency had exceeded the limits imposed on it by the US constitution. This argument applied whoever the president was – though it might vary slightly in scale, depending on the office holder. The creation of nuclear weapons in 1945 and the continuous cold war of the era were major reasons why presidents had become so powerful. The constitution made the president the commander-in-chief of US forces. If the USA was permanently in a war, albeit undeclared, against the USSR, then the president could justify most of his actions in terms of his being the military leader of the USA. Schlesinger wrote his book in the early 1970s, as he observed the abuse of presidential power by Richard Nixon and, to a lesser extent, by Lyndon Johnson.

This abuse of power, highlighted by publication of *The Pentagon Papers* in 1971 and confirmed by the Watergate affair from 1972 to 1974, resulted in a reaction against presidential power. Not only did Nixon in 1974 become the first president to have to resign but Congress imposed a series of checks and controls on the presidency. The most useful example of these controls is the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which limited the power of the president to commit US forces to war. In theory, only Congress has the power to declare war. In practice, no president has accepted the limits of the War Powers Resolution. So great was the reaction to Nixon’s ‘imperial presidency’ that some coined the phrase ‘imperilled presidency’ to describe the limited power of the usually overlooked Presidency of Gerald Ford in 1974–1976. The term was even more applicable to his successor, Jimmy Carter. By 1979, compared with 1945, the power of the presidency had diminished. Ronald Reagan was to change all that.

8 Why, and with what success, did the USA introduce the policy of affirmative action in the late 1960s? [30]

Outside the USA, affirmative action is often called positive discrimination. Although Kennedy began the first moves towards affirmative action, it was Johnson and Nixon who took it much further. It applies to public sector organisations in the area of housing, employment and educational opportunities. It initially applied to African Americans but was soon extended to women and disabled people. The main focus has always been on the African American dimension, however. Affirmative action was introduced in response to great political pressure from African Americans in the 1960s, especially in the cities. They argued that they needed special treatment with regard to social and economic opportunities. Gaining political rights was not enough. They argued that affirmative action was needed to help redress the longstanding mistreatment of the black minority by the white majority. Thus any organisation receiving federal funds needed to make sure it did not have policies which disadvantaged racial minorities, especially black people. This strategy, much opposed by many white people, was very controversial. It resulted in many Supreme Court cases. Among the more significant was the 1978 case, *Regents of the University of California vs. Bakke*. Here the Supreme Court ruled that the university could not set places aside for blacks, though it could take the proportion of different ethnic groups on a course into account in order to achieve ethnic balance. This distinction has been broadly upheld ever since, though the Reagan administration of the 1980s gave much less support to affirmative action. College classes have become more ethnically mixed. The success of affirmative action in the 1970s and 1980s is hard to assess. Few individuals are identified as having benefited from affirmative action. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas says he is one and opposes affirmative action as patronising. Secretary of State Colin Powell says he is another and welcomes affirmative action. Any more general, statistical analysis is hard to carry out. Racial barriers were weakened in the 1970s and 1980s. A black middle class was even more distinct by 1991. How far that social change was helped by affirmative action is impossible to say.
To what extent was the globalisation of the Cold War between 1950 and 1975 caused by the American policy of containment?

In support of the view that the globalisation of the Cold War was caused by the American policy of containment, it could be argued that the USA saw communism as a threat to the free market economy on which the USA depended for its trade and economic prosperity. Containment was designed to prevent the spread of communism. After the fall of China to communism in 1949, the USA became convinced that there was a monolithic communist plot for world domination which had to be resisted. The following examples could be used:

- Korea – the USA believed that North Korea’s attack on South Korea was inspired by the USSR and China. This is unlikely – although Stalin gave the ‘go ahead’ for the attack, he made it clear that the USSR had no wish to become directly involved. In trying to defend an unpopular and brutal regime in South Korea, the USA involved American and UN troops in what was essentially a regional, nationalistic war, thus globalising the Cold War.
- Cuba – the USA believed that the USSR was trying to expand its influence into the western hemisphere and therefore intervened in an attempt to prevent Cuba remaining communist.
- Vietnam – the USA believed in the ‘domino effect’; if one country fell to communism, it would quickly spread further. Hence US involvement in Vietnam, Cambodia etc., which spread the Cold War into Southeast Asia.
- Latin America – the USA became involved in many Latin American countries in an attempt to prevent the spread of communism, e.g. Chile, Guatemala, Brazil and Nicaragua.
- Africa – US involvement in Congo, Ghana etc.
- Middle East – the USA was active in the Middle East in an attempt to prevent the spread of communism.

In challenging the view that the globalisation of the Cold War was caused by the American policy of containment, it could be argued that in many of the cases cited above, it was not containment which caused the globalisation of the Cold War. After the publication of NSC-68 in 1950, the USA adopted a more aggressive foreign policy, based more on roll-back than containment, e.g. in Korea when the USA/UN forces went beyond the 38th parallel, thus incurring the anger of China; similarly in Laos and Cambodia the USA went beyond containment. The USA’s initial involvement in Cuba had more to do with the Monroe Doctrine than with containment; the USA opposed Castro (who was a nationalist rather than a communist) because he posed a threat to US economic dominance in the Caribbean. It was the USSR which spread the Cold War to Cuba by supporting Castro. Stalin had spoken openly of worldwide communist revolution, and the USSR supported pro-communist groups in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Although Khrushchev spoke of ‘peaceful coexistence’, he still believed that communism would spread worldwide and was willing to support what he saw as new and vulnerable communist states, e.g. Cuba. The USSR and China provided military support to communist forces in Korea and Vietnam. Stalin was at least implicitly involved in the invasion of South Korea by North Korea. There were other factors which caused the globalisation of the Cold War, for example, the creation of many new and unstable states as a result of decolonisation, and the willingness of many political leaders involved in regional conflicts to exploit superpower rivalry for their own ends.
10 Was Ronald Reagan more responsible than Mikhail Gorbachev for ending the Cold War?

In support of the view that Reagan was more responsible than Gorbachev, it could be argued that the ‘triumpalist’ view is correct:
- Reagan saw the USSR as ‘the evil empire’ and moved away from détente, taking a hard line.
- Reagan increased defence spending and developed new ways of deploying nuclear missiles (e.g. stealth bomber, trident submarines). For the USSR to match the USA’s SDI plans would have meant bankruptcy. Reagan aimed to regain military supremacy in order to gain concessions from the USSR.
- ‘Reagan Doctrine’ involved sending assistance to anti-communist insurgents and anti-communist governments, e.g. Nicaragua, El Salvador and Grenada. This was intended to cause the USSR military, political and economic problems, often without the use of American troops.
- Reagan supplied support for anti-communist forces in Afghanistan.
- ‘Voice of America’ and ‘Radio Free Europe’ were used to encourage anti-communist sentiment in Eastern Europe. The USA provided support to Solidarity in Poland.
- Reagan received support from Thatcher, who allowed US nuclear weapons to be based in the UK.
- Reagan was willing to negotiate with Gorbachev, although he did so from a position of strength.

In challenging the view that Reagan was more responsible than Gorbachev, it could be argued that:
- Gorbachev realised that the main problem facing the USSR was its failing economy; to address this, he needed to reduce arms spending and, thus, needed to make arms deals with the USA.
- Gorbachev wanted to reduce the USSR’s commitment to propping up communist governments around the world, which was a major drain on Soviet resources (as in Afghanistan, Cuba and Vietnam and even in Eastern Europe).
- Gorbachev wanted to rejuvenate socialism by introducing a degree of liberalisation. His policies of glasnost and perestroika split and eventually undermined the position of the Communist Party.
- In 1985 Gorbachev made it clear that he would not uphold the Brezhnev Doctrine. This effectively enabled the people of Eastern Europe to choose their own governments; communism collapsed in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania.
- The ‘Velvet Revolution’ in Eastern Europe encouraged nationalists within the USSR.
- Gorbachev was willing to negotiate with Reagan. After a series of summit meetings, both men declared the end of the Cold War in Malta (1989).

11 ‘Mao Zedong’s only legacy was the political and economic devastation of China.’ How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that redistributing land from large landowners to peasants led to violence – some argue that as many as two million were killed.
- Hundred Flowers Campaign – a new class of technicians, engineers and intellectuals attacked the party cadres for incompetence, the government for over-centralisation and the CCP for being undemocratic.
- The Great Leap Forward – Mao attempted to increase agricultural output and adapt industry to Chinese conditions (rather than copying Russian methods). This led to communes and smaller-scale industrial units. This led to opposition, and was hindered by bad harvests (1959–1961) and withdrawal of Soviet aid following the Sino-Soviet split. Many died of starvation; the Great Leap Forward was blamed and Mao was forced to resign as Chairman of the Peoples’ Congress.
• The Cultural Revolution 1966–1969 – right-wing members of CCP wanted incentives (e.g. piecework, greater wage differentials etc.) and an expert managerial class to run industry. Mao dismissed this as ‘revisionist’ and wanted to avoid the development of a privileged class. Mao launched a propaganda campaign to renew revolutionary fervour, which led to chaos. Student masses denounced and attacked those in authority (teachers, professionals, party officials); extremists amongst the Red Guards were out of control. Mao had to use the army to restore control. The Cultural Revolution caused disruption, ruined millions of lives and held up China's economic development by ten years.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that Mao inherited major problems in 1949 – China was devastated by civil war and war with Japan. Transport had been destroyed and there were chronic food shortages. China was a vast country with some 600 million people. Mao developed a constitution, formally adopted in 1954, which provided China with a strong, centralised government for the first time in many years.

• Agricultural changes – Mao transformed a country of small, inefficient private farms into one of large co-operative farms as in Russia.

• Industrial changes – most businesses were nationalised and a five year plan was begun in 1953 based on heavy industry. Full communications were restored, inflation was under control and the economy was healthier.

In the long-term, the Great Leap Forward gained success – both agricultural and industrial production grew and by mid-1960s, China was able to feed its massive population. Communes proved to be an efficient unit of local government. Keeping industry small-scale and labour-intensive ensured that there was little unemployment. Communes also led to the spread of education and welfare services and improved the position of women in society. There was economic recovery in mid-1970s and China was far healthier when Mao died in 1976 than it had been in 1949 – the population was healthier, better educated and better organised. Grain production had kept pace with population growth, industrial development had tripled steel production, China had become a nuclear power and there was a reasonable flow of consumer goods.


Reasons why Israel launched a pre-emptive strike in 1967 might include that Israel had plenty of warning regarding an impending Arab attack. New governments in Iraq and Syria were influenced by the Ba'ath Party and were prepared to co-operate with Egypt against Israel. Syria began bombing Jewish settlements from the Golan Heights. Egyptian leader Nasser believed that, with support from Syria and Iraq, the time was right for an attack on Israel. Caught between allied hostile states to the north and south as well as fighting guerrillas operating from Jordan, Israel had already adopted a hard-line approach, e.g. in November 1966, Israel launched a ground offensive into Jordan; in April 1967, Israel shot down Syrian jets over Damascus. Nasser forced the UN to remove its peace-keeping force, moved troops up to the frontier in Sinai and closed the Gulf of Aqaba. In view of Arab troop movements, Israel saw the closure of the straits as a cause of wars (as in 1956). Israeli negotiations with the USA showed that America would not intervene. On 4 June 1967, a National Unity government was formed in Israel and the new defence minister (Moshe Dayan) tipped the balance in favour of a pre-emptive strike. Israel's success in the Six-Day War was due to the slow and ponderous build-up of Arab forces, Israeli air superiority and inadequate Arab preparations.

Reasons why Israel did not launch a pre-emptive strike in 1973 might include the fact that Israel was in a much stronger position as a result of the Six-Day War. Arab unity had been discredited and Israel now had much more land. The response of Arab states to defeat in 1967 was disunited. Sadat (Egypt) sought negotiations with Israel. Syria sought military build-up and a future war with Israel. Jordan and Lebanon, internally weak, simply withdrew from the conflict with Israel. Meanwhile, PLO terrorism continued. Sadat was concerned that PLO terrorism would
discredit the Arab cause in world opinion and was convinced of the need for a negotiated settlement with Israel. He wanted the USA to encourage Israel to negotiate, but the USA refused. Sadat decided, with Syria, to attack Israel again in order to force the USA to act as mediators. Egypt felt stronger because of Russian weapons and training by Russian military advisers. The Arab attack came on 6 October 1973 and is one of Israeli intelligence’s greatest failures. Israel had underestimated Arab frustration over its occupation of the Golan Heights, Sinai, West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel had perceived the Arabs as weak and not ready for another war. Political and military leaders had become complacent, convinced of their own invincibility. Egyptian and Syrian forces attacked on the feast of Yom Kippur, hoping to catch the Israelis off guard. After early successes, the Arabs were forced back by Israeli troops equipped with American-supplied weaponry. Although Israel managed to retain the 1967 frontiers, she had come close to defeat and was more willing to negotiate.
Indicative content

13 Analyse the role of leadership in the achievement of African independence by any one country you have studied. [30]

Focus: Candidates will need to set the role of leadership within the framework of the achievement of independence in the country they have chosen. They should show understanding of the key phases of the nationalist movement which may be a transition from elite nationalism to mass nationalism, peaceful negotiation or armed struggle. The most suitable examples might be: Ghana (Nkrumah) 1957, Guinea (Sekou Touré) 1958, Senegal (Senghor) 1960, Congo (Kasavubu/Lumumba) 1960, Ivory Coast (Houphouet-Boigny) 1960, Nigeria (Azikiwe/Awolowo) 1960, Tanzania (Nyerere) 1961, Uganda (Obote) 1962, Kenya (Kenyatta) 1963, Malawi (Banda) 1964, Zambia (Kaunda) 1964, or Zimbabwe (Nkomo/Mugabe) 1980. Where strong personal leadership was a significant factor is well-documented and is accessible to students. Choice will depend on resources available, local interest and the expertise of teachers. As this question focuses on the period before independence, majority rule in Zimbabwe is within the timeframe of the paper.

Candidates should aim to weigh up the relative importance of such factors as the charisma and political skill of individual leaders, the strength and power-base of political parties, the willingness of the colonial power to support decolonisation, the previous involvement and experience of Africans in the legislature, the economic viability of the proposed country and any other pressure groups operating within the colony. While there is no need to compare between countries, this is one approach which could be used effectively to evaluate the role of leadership. Additionally, or alternatively, a useful comparison might be developed between the African pre-conditions of independence movements, whether, for example the tribal heritage had a strong leadership tradition. As the question asks for an analysis of the role of leadership, a biographical account of a particular leader on its own will not gain high marks.

Other factors which might be used to evaluate how important the leader was in a particular country’s achievement of independence:
- Effects of WWII, e.g. discrediting of France when overrun by Germany; impoverishment of Britain after the war; American pressure to decolonise; experiences of Africans fighting for the Allies.
- Precedent of Indian independence achieved in 1947.
- Beginnings of Cold War politics – political pressure and financial support given with strings (overt or covert).
- United Nations – offered prospect of equal status to new African countries; ethos against colonialism; gave a boost to African nationalism.

14 How did the role and nature of political parties change after independence? [30]

Focus: Candidates should aim to show how nationalist movements had been a great unifying factor in the years leading up to independence and how, once independence was achieved, tribal rivalries often re-emerged. Understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of immediate post-independence governments should be shown. Perhaps a key question should be whether political parties helped or hindered the processes of nation-building. As the question requires an analysis of the processes of change candidates should base their answer on two or three aspects of change which they deal with in depth, with reference to particular countries which they have studied. For example:
• How the power-base and support for parties changed – political parties claiming national and inter-ethnic support often had to struggle, e.g. the NCNC in Nigeria became a regional rather than a national party; some political parties were driven underground, e.g. only the PDG remained in the open in Guinea; some parties chose to ally with others, e.g. in Uganda, pluralism created problems so the UPC allied with the KY, in Kenya, KANU became the Kikuyu and Luo party and KADU was forced out.

• How the purpose and aims of parties changed – before independence there was a unifying purpose, but new states faced multiple problems, not least how to harness the economic resources of the country, develop industrial potential, satisfy workers and improve standards of living; it now became a question of which party could offer more chances of personal gain rather than the ideals of nationalism.

• How political parties contributed to state-building – newly independent states began with an inherited political structure, e.g. in British colonies, the Westminster model, usually multi-party with a bicameral legislature and electoral competition. How far did the new political elites accept or attempt to change these models?

15 What economic problems did African countries face on achieving independence and how successfully did they deal with them? [30]

Focus: This question could be addressed thematically by candidates, first identifying the problems, then using particular countries to illustrate successes/failures in dealing with them, or by taking two or three countries and analysing their particular problems. Just two countries dealt with separately could form the basis of a very good answer. Alternatively, candidates could show their depth of understanding thematically using a wider range of examples to illustrate each point.

Problems in agriculture included:
• the colonial legacy left Africa producing what it did not consume, so food had to be imported while cash crops were exported, e.g. grain/meat/root crops for tea/coffee/cocoa
• neglect of countryside to develop urban centres – hospitals, schools, roads, railways, electricity, gas, housing were signs of progress, while African farmers were neglected
• international aid in the form of food subsidies tended to benefit the consumer rather than the producer, or government projects rather than people
• over-bureaucratization of agriculture – marketing boards etc. – but problems were not really addressed
• use of foreign technology/expertise has sometimes had disastrous consequences for Africa, e.g. soil erosion in Tanzania as a result of the Canadian wheat programme
• social inequalities – women traditionally did much of the small-farming, but men came to run the projects; educated children went to the towns, depriving their local communities of expertise.

Problems in industry included:
• Africa’s traditional role was as a supplier of primary products, mainly agricultural in West Africa, minerals elsewhere; implicit understanding that colonies should never compete with industry of metropole; structural weakness of under-industrialisation during colonial era
• gradual industrial development in 1950s; Belgian Congo one of most industrialised colonies on eve of independence in 1958 giving (false) hopes of successful transition and wealth creation
• new states accepted that industrialising was vital – they were prepared to accept help and adopt policies which seemed to bring in the highest profits, e.g. Ghana adopted a socialist model, with five and seven year plans, intended to bring about economic transformation; the private sector was allowed to exist, but the state took control of means of production
• free-enterprise economies, e.g. Ivory Coast, primarily agricultural, sought foreign capital and offered very favourable terms to foreign investors to develop industry on an import
substitution basis; focus on industrialisation of palm oil, sugar and cotton production – alternatively known as ‘Ivorian miracle’ or ‘growth without development’

- where there were resources, e.g. in Nigeria, spectacular industrial development was possible, but this was affected by civil war (1967–1970) and fluctuations in oil prices
- some intra-African strategies have been developed for supplying energy and global initiatives in the southern hemisphere to demand better terms from the North and the West
- ideas of negative decolonisation (freedom from colonial control) and positive decolonisation (freedom to participate as equal partners in the global political and economic scene).

16 Was Pan-Africanism ever a realistic objective?  

Focus: Before independence Pan-Africanism was a ‘means to an end’, as nationalist movements in all colonies gained strength from the joint struggle. After independence, internal problems predominated. Candidates could therefore use Pan-Africanist moves among the unfree as part of their answer.

Steps towards African unity include:

- aim of political, cultural and economic integration given dynamic leadership by Nkrumah after independence of Ghana in 1957; Ghana/Guinea Union in 1958, then Ghana/Guinea/Mali Union
- Conference of Independent African States and All-Africa Peoples Conference held in Accra 1958; 2nd conference in Monrovia 1959, 3rd in Addis Ababa 1960. Hopes of common market and some form of political unity discussed
- most colonies retained links with metropole (common language, economic ties etc.) but having fought for freedom, emphasised the post-independence principle of non-interference which worked against African unity
- splits occurred within post-independence groupings, e.g. Brazzaville, Monrovia and Casablanca groups within ex-French colonies
- PAFMECA (Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa) attacked by Nkrumah as sectionalist and working against African unity
- OAU (Organization of African Unity) (formed in 1963) brought western and eastern blocs to together, but could not attempt political unity; affirmed total liberation of continent and non-alignment with other power blocs; mechanisms were established for peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; OAU Charter remained in place until 1982.

Factors working against African unity include:

- vastness of continent, poor communications, large sparsely populated areas and fragmented economies
- obvious need for self-interest among newly independent states; emphasis on nation, rather than tribe, but wider cultural or inter-ethnic unions would weaken new nation states
- great gulf between aims and ideals of northern, western, southern and central African leaders and states
- political unity meant surrender of sovereignty to some extent and this was unwelcome to those who had so recently struggled for independence
- military revolutions 1965–1966 replaced many of the early nationalist leaders and with them, Pan-Africanist ideals.
Depth Study 5: Southeast Asian History, 1945–1990s

Indicative content

17 Assess the importance of Japanese rule during World War II in the development of nationalism in Southeast Asia. [30]

The issue here is the relative importance of Japanese rule compared with other factors such as the development of nationalist ideology and organisation before the war; the influence of key nationalist leaders; the existing hostility to the nature of colonial rule and the weakening of colonial powers. The key issue is Japan and its influence on nationalism and this should be well-established. The nature of Japanese rule varied and better answers will make a distinction between areas such as the former Netherlands East Indies, where the Japanese encouraged more collaboration, and areas where they ruled more as colonisers, such as Singapore, where the Chinese populations suffered considerable hardship and oppression. General considerations might be the humiliation of the western powers in defeats such as the fall of Singapore and the capture of the Philippines, ending the myth of European/US white supremacy and the victory of an Asian power.

There could be discussion of the greater sense of regional economic unity with the East Asia Co-prosperity Zone, though many will see this as ineffective in regional terms and a cover for Japanese economic exploitation. Where the Japanese did make efforts to share power, experience of government was offered to local nationalists. Where there was oppression, nationalists gained prestige and experience from resistance. The opposition to Japan gave prestige to nationalist organisations and leaders. The discontinuities of Japanese rule made it harder for the former colonial powers to re-establish authority. Also the weaknesses brought about by the war meant that fewer resources were available to maintain control. The ideology of the Atlantic Charter made colonial rule less acceptable.

Higher-level answers will offer judgements about relative importance. They will also make distinctions between different areas in Southeast Asia. The example of India which owed little to Japanese actions might be seen as significant and it could be said that while the Japanese victories had a major impact, there had already been a growth of nationalism and it was more that the war as a whole weakened European power to resist and increased the influence of the USA which had already moved towards self-government for its major Southeast Asian colony. No set answer is expected.

18 Assess the reasons why Vietnam was divided for so long after 1954. [30]

The prolonged division after the defeat of France is the main focus here and explanations may link the nature of the communist resistance to French rule and its success with the reluctance of the South, bolstered by US support. The focus is on the prolonged division after France’s defeat. The issue is whether internal divisions or foreign intervention were the main factors. The determination of the North and its relentless campaign kept the armed struggle going, but the resources of the Viet Cong were not sufficient to overcome the South. This might be explained by the increasing intervention of the USA, alarmed by fears of the spread of communist influence in the region. The scale of commitment by the USA was not decisive enough to end the struggle and defeat the North. There could be discussion of why US tactics could not be decisive and why it was difficult, given the nature of the war to achieve a decisive victory.

Discussion could balance external influences with the divisions within the country. The context of the Cold War and fears of the consequences of compromise by both sides may explain why a negotiated settlement involving national unity was not possible. The increasing scale of the war
prevented discussion about unity but was not enough, even with considerable bombing by the US and radical resettlement plans, to end the conflict. No set answer is expected.

19 To what extent does the leadership of Pol Pot explain the radicalism of the Khmer Rouge's rule in Cambodia? [30]

‘Democratic Kampuchea’ between 1975 to 1979 led to possibly one million deaths, high levels of internal repression, social engineering which was undertaken without consideration of its brutal effects on the population, and incursions into Vietnam. The issue is whether the contextual circumstances explain this or whether the responsibility falls on Pol Pot personally. The key issue is Pol Pot and his influence. The leader linked Marxist thought and guerrilla tactics with a vision, possibly influenced by his stay with the hall tribes of Northern Cambodia, of a simpler and more egalitarian society. His regime was responsible for ‘year zero’ radicalism, suppressing any elements of foreign culture and pursuing radical measures to end class distinction. The ideas of Pol Pot and his distinctive social and political vision should be examined.

The discussion is whether the context is more important. The civil war had cost a considerable amount of lives – perhaps 500,000 had died in 1970–1975 – and established a culture of brutality. Many of Pol Pot’s followers shared antagonism to foreigners – Americans, Thais and Vietnamese – associated with national humiliation. The resentments against the previous regime were important and the youth of many of Pol Pot’s followers was a major consideration. Although Pol Pot brought together many elements of resentment – against the privileged class, the old regime, foreign influence and married tradition and Marxist philosophy – it was done within a context of dislocation, war and the example of China’s social experimentation and the violence in the region brought about by the war in Vietnam.

20 ‘More successful economically than politically.’ Assess this view of ASEAN since 1967. [30]

The original aims of ASEAN were both economic and political – to establish regional stability to allow nation-building. Economic co-operation would be both a means of bolstering stability and a result of that stability. The debate is whether the increased links with China, Japan and South Korea, the continuing movement towards free trade, and the large amount of discussion and planned co-operation on a range of economic, environmental and energy issues have been more significant in terms of outcome than the political developments.

The debate: in terms of political development, the focus has been on the ASEAN Way – a veto on any joint action can be exercised by any member, and persuasion and discussion are used as a means of conflict resolution rather than pressure which may alienate states by threatening their political independence. Supporters point to the special nature of this political philosophy and to the limited internal conflicts since 1967, to the importance of regular regional meetings and consultations and to the moral influence of ASEAN. Critics point to its ineffectiveness in preventing territorial disputes, to the limited influence on armed conflict when it has arisen (for example in Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia) and to the support that ASEAN offers to existing elites. If the view is taken that economic co-operation has yielded more, arguments could be made that after 1967 tariffs and barriers to intra-regional trade fell. Indonesia, for example, had 85% duties in the 1970s and these had fallen to 17% in the 1990s. Before 1997, growth rates of inter-regional trade of 10% were common. ASEAN countries saw an increase in their percentage of world exports from 2% to 6% between the 1970s and 1990s. There was an increase in manufacturing trade and also the rise of the ‘tiger economies’ which could be said to have owed much to the protracted internal security of the region. However, there are counter arguments which look at limitations to liberalisation – full free trade was not achieved; ASEAN as a whole attracted less foreign investment than China; export industries in ASEAN countries compete more than they co-operate; the income generated from freer trade is variable; and the ability of ASEAN
to deal with the 1997 Asian financial crash revealed considerable limitations. In this scenario, the political impact has been greater in that the major contribution to economic development has been the relatively peaceful political environment. No set answer is expected, but higher-level answers will consider alternative viewpoints and offer support for judgements.